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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Justin Ryan Moss timely appeals from three orders which revoked his probation
in docket numbers 38541, 38590, and 38600. In all three cases, Mr. Moss argues that
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when it refused to augment
the record with transcripts of various hearings. In all three cases, Mr. Moss argues that
the respective district court's abused their discretion when they revoked his probation.
In docket number 38541, Mr. Moss also argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence pursuant his oral I.C.R. 35 motion due to
the various mitigating factors.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2006, docket number 38600, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to the charge of issuing
checks without funds. (#38600 R., pp.26-27, 43.) Thereafter, the district court entered
an order withholding judgment and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38600 R., p.4753.)
In 2008, docket number 38590, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to the charge of grand
theft. (#38590 R., pp.39.) Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment of conviction
and imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38590 R., pp.39-45.) Additionally, the
district court ordered this sentence to be served concurrently with Mr. Moss' sentence in
docket number 38590. (#38590 R., p.40.)
The district court also violated Mr. Moss' probation in docket number 38600,
based on the new conviction.

(10/23/08 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-15, p.25, Ls.1-21; #38600
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R., pp.91-93.) Thereafter, the district court revoked the withheld judgment, imposed a
unified sentence of three years, with eighteen months fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Moss on probation. (#38600 R., pp.91-93.)
In 2009, docket number 38541, Mr. Moss pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery.
(#38541 R., p.65.) Thereafter, the district court imposed two unified sentences of ten
years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.

(#38541

R., pp.65-69.)

Additionally, these two sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one
another, and concurrently with the sentence in docket number 38600.
R., p.66.)

Mr. Moss

successfully completed

his

period

of retained

(#38541
jurisdiction

(hereinafter, rider) and was placed on probation. (#38541 R., pp. 77-83.)

In docket numbers 38600 and 38590, the State filed two motions alleging
probation violations primarily based on the forgery allegations contained in docket
number 38541. (#38600, R. pp.102-104; #38590 R., pp.62-64.)

In both cases,

Mr. Moss' probation was revoked and he was ordered on a rider in each cases to run
concurrent to one another and concurrent with the rider ordered in docket number
38541.

(#38590 R., pp.88-90; #38600 R., pp.126-127.)

Mr. Moss successfully

completed this period of retained jurisdiction and was placed on probation.

(#38590

R., pp.94-98; # 38600 R., pp.134-138.)

After a period of probation, the State filed various motions alleging that Mr. Moss
had violated his probation, all of which were based on the same conduct.
R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103; #38600 R., pp.141-143.)

(# 38541

A probation violation

evidentiary hearing was held in docket number 38541, and the district court found that
Mr. Moss had violated various terms of his probation when he moved to California
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without appropriate authorization. (#38541 R., pp.120-122; see generally 02/01/11 Tr.)1
Based on the district court's finding that Mr. Moss violated his probation in docket
number 38541, Mr. Moss was collaterally estopped from contesting the State's
probation violation allegations in docket numbers 38541 and 38600.

(#38541

R., pp.130-137, 140-141; #38600 R., pp.170-177, 180-181.)

At the probation violation disposition hearing, in docket number 38541, Mr. Moss
made a request for a sentence reduction, which was denied by the district court.
(02/08/11 Tr., p.44, Ls.18-25; #38541 R., pp.120-122.) Thereafter, Mr. Moss' probation
was revoked in all three cases.

(#38541 R., pp.120-122; #38590 R., pp.142-143;

#38600 R., pp.182-183.) Mr. Moss timely appeals the revocation of his probation in all
three cases. 2

(#38541 R., pp.125-127; #38590 R., pp.147-149; #38600 R., pp.185-

187.)
On appeal, Mr. Moss' appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be
augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.)
The State objected to Mr. Moss' request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof,"

1

The district court's February 10, 2011, Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence,
and Commitment erroneously states that Mr. Moss admitted to various probation
violations. (#38541 R., p.121.) However, Mr. Moss contested the State's allegations,
and a full evidentiary hearing was held. (see generally 02/01/11 Tr.)
2
At the probation violation hearing held in docket number 38590 and 38600, Mr. Moss
and his trial counsel both requested that the district court revoke his probation and
impose the underlying sentences. (03/02/11 Tr., p.57, L.13 - p.58, L.21.) Therefore
Mr. Moss' claims that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and imposed an excessively harsh sentence are both made mindfully of the
doctrine of invited error.
3

(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme

Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, denying Mr. Moss' request for the transcripts.

(Order Denying Motion to

Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to
Augment), pp.1-2.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Moss due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Moss' probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Moss'
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, in docket number 38541,
upon revoking his probation?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Moss filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of
various hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to revoke
probation, a district court can considered all of the hearings before and after sentencing.
On appeal, Mr. Moss is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for
transcripts of Hearing held on February 9, 2010, in docket number 38541, Probation
Violation Hearing held on September 3, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600,
Disposition Hearing held on September 17, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600,
and Rider Review Hearing held on February 11, 2010 in all three cases.

Mr. Moss

asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues addressed at the
probation revocation hearing because they occurred before and after sentencing, and
the district court can, therefore, rely on its memory of those hearings when it decided to
revoke Mr. Moss' probation. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his
request.
6

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Moss With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.
I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State,
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding
7

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
8

death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court"' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
9

In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be

10

adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Moss fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Moss' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that

is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Moss' Motion to Augment will render
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support
12

the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural bar to
the review of Mr. Moss' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Moss should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption
should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Moss With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United State Supreme Court:
13

In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United

States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See a/so Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Moss has
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:

14

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Moss' probation. Counsel is also unable to advise
Mr. Moss on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Moss is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Moss his constitutional right to due
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Moss' Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moss was found in violation of his probation for absconding to California.

However, there were no new allegations indicating that Mr. Moss had committed any
new crimes.

When this is viewed in light of the mitigating factors, it supports the
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conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Moss'
probation.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Moss' Probation
Mr. Moss asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its

discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987).
State

v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).
Mr. Moss concedes that he violated the terms his probation. Accordingly, he only

contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's decision
to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court
abused its discretion." State

v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (citing State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994)). "When a district court's discretionary

decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion,
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a
violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of
16

society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Jones, 123
Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1988)). "[l]f
a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the
probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without
first considering alternative methods to address the violation." Id. (citing Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-83)). ''Only if the trial

court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular
situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the
protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient,
genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order." Id.
The State did not allege that Mr. Moss had committed any new crimes when it
alleged he violated his probation.

(#38541 R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103;

#38600 R., pp.141-143.) Mr. Moss' various probation violations were based on his
decision to move to California and his failure to make payments for his public defender's
fees. (# 38541 R., pp.90-92; #38590 R., pp.101-103; #38600 R., pp.141-143.) At the
probation violation evidentiary hearing, the State dismissed the failure to pay public
defenders fees allegation.

(02/01/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.11-24.)

Mr. Moss probation was

violated because he absconded. (02/01/11 Tr., p.62, L.1 - p.64, L.8.) Which Mr. Moss
does not want to understate the seriousness of this probation violation; it is important to
note that he did not commit any new crimes. Since no new crimes were committed,
Mr. Moss' probation was not threatening society.
Additionally, there are mitigating factor's present which support the conclusion
that the district court abused its discretion when it violated Mr. Moss' probation.
Specifically, there is a nexus between Mr. Moss' bipolar disorder and the commission of
17

the underlying offenses. In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a crime
and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense the
defendant's mental health problems.

Here, Mr. Moss was diagnosed with bipolar

disorder with psychotic features and suffers from hallucinations and depression.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12, 19.)3

Mr. Moss'

recidivism risk is reduced when his mental health is properly treated. (PSI, pp.6-7, 1415, 389.)

In fact, Mr. Moss performed well while on his rider and the IDOC

recommended probation.

(PSI, p.66.)

Mr. Moss was suffering from a manic phase

when committed his 2008 offense in docket number 38590. (PSI, pp.383-384.) During
a manic state, Mr. Moss jumped off a roof in 2007, and had to undergo a hernia repair
surgery as a result. (PSI, p.389.)

Further, he attempted suicide after his grandmother

died in 2001 and stabbed himself in the head when he was sixteen.

(PSI, p.12.)

According to his trial counsel:
[T]here is clearly something wrong with him. He's been diagnosed as
bipolar. There's a couple psychological evaluations in the presentence.
I think the most telling is they said that, if he's not on his
medication, there's a high likelihood of reoffending.

3

There are three separate but identical electronic PSls in each case, therefore, the
citations in this brief will not distinguish between docket numbers. Additionally, the PSI
was submitted in a PDF format and contains various attachments, which were
numbered consecutively. For ease of citation, the Appellant's Brief will adhere to the
same pagination contained the PDF format, which begins with August 20, 2009, PSI
and ends on page 607.
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(02/08/11 Tr., p.42, Ls.19-24.) Since there is a nexus between Mr. Moss' mental health
and the his commission of the underlying offenses this mitigating factor should be
afforded greater weight.

However, the district court expressly refused to Mr. Moss'

mental health as a mitigating factor when it imposed the underlying sentence. (08/25/09
Tr., p.30, Ls.18-25.)
Additionally, Mr. Moss' family support is a mitigating factor. In State v. Shideler,
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and
friends were mitigating factors.

Mr. Moss received letters from friends and family

attesting to his good nature and pledging support. (R., pp.78, 93-94.) Mr. Moss' family
support was also recognized by his trial counsel. (02/02/11 Tr., p.43, Ls.14-15.)
Additionally, Mr. Moss' college education and employment should be considered
a mitigating factor. Mr. Moss completed high school and enrolled in college courses at
Boise State University. (PSI, pp.5-6.) Mr. Moss also has training in avalanche control,
search and rescue, emergency health for winter, and swift water rescue. (PSI, p.465.)
Mr. Moss' education and search and rescue related skills increase the likelihood he will
be able to find employment upon his release from custody. The mitigating weight of this
should be amplified

because his offenses are financially motivated,

and with

employment he will have a reduced incentive to recidivate.
Mr. Moss' troubled childhood should be considered as a mitigating factor. The
Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's
childhood as a mitigating factor. State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
Mr. Moss' parents fought constantly and his father was alcoholic. (PSI, p.459.)
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In sum, Mr. Moss' most recent probation violations where not as serious the
underlying offenses. When this is considered in light of the mitigating factors it supports
the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation.
111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Moss' Unified
Sentence Of Ten Years. With Five Years Fixed 1 Upon Revoking His Probation

A

Introduction
The district court expressly disregarded Mr. Moss' mental health as a mitigating

factor when it imposed the underlying sentence in docket number 38541. Since the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant's mental health is a mitigating
factor, the district court's sentence was excessive as originally imposed. Therefore, the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to honor Mr. Moss' request for a
reduction of his sentence at the probation violation disposition hearing.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Moss'
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Revoking His
Probation
Mr. Moss asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten

years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under I.C.R.
35 to sua sponte reduce the length of the original sentence upon the revocation of
probation, on appeal, an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
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In the context of an

appeal from an order revoking probation, "an appellate court will not consider whether
the sentence was excessive when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction"
instead, "review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the
circumstances existing when the court revoked probation." Jensen, 138 Idaho at 944
(citing State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Paramore, 119
Idaho 235, 236 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1982)) (emphasis in original). Further,
when this Court reviews "a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, [the Court] will examine the entire record encompassing events before and
after the original judgment." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Moss does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Moss must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)).
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)).
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As a preliminary matter, Mr. Moss would incorporate the arguments made in
section ll(B), supra.
The district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Mr. Moss' mental
health as a mitigating factor. At sentencing, the district court stated as follows:
I have met other people that are bipolar. It doesn't cause greed, and it
doesn't cause theft. It causes excess behavior, but it doesn't necessarily
cause excess illegal behavior.
So I do not see that as a justification or even an explanation. It is
certainly something that has to be dealt with and should be dealt with.
(08/25/09 Tr., p.30, Ls.18-25.)

In Payne, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that

mental health is a migrating factor, and implicitly held that the mitigating weight should
be amplified when there is a nexus between a defendant's mental health and the
commission of an offense.

In this case a health examination was performed and it

concluded that Mr. Moss posses a reduced risk to society when his mental health is
treated. (PSI, pp.14-15.) Therefore, the mental health evaluations implicitly concluded
that there is a link between Mr. Moss' mental health and his criminal behavior.
Therefore, Mr. Moss' sentence was excessively harsh when it was originally imposed
because he mental health was not considered. The district court should have honored
Mr. Moss' request for a sentence reduction at the probation violation disposition
hearing, because his mental health was argued as a mitigating factor at that hearing,
and the district court did not consider it as a mitigating factor when it originally imposed
his sentence. (02/0811 Tr., p.42, L.19-p.45, L.16.)
In sum Mr. Moss' original sentence did not take his mental health into
consideration and that factor should been considered at the probation violation
disposition hearing. Therefore, the district court abused to reduce Mr. Moss' sentence
at the probation violation disposition hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moss respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Moss respectfully
requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district court to place
Mr. Moss on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate.

Alternatively,

Mr. Moss respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his fixed sentence in
docket number 38541.
DATED this 18th day of January, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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